





efore Soviet Leader Mikhael Gorbachev prop-
agated fundamental reforms in the Eastern
bloc,the prospect of German reunification had wide-
ly been regarded, within both east and west
Germany, as a distant hope rather than a concrete
policy option. When the wall came down and Ger-
man unification became a realistic option, Germany
was not well prepared for this enormous task.While
several reunification scenarios were initially dis-
cussed, the German states opted for rapid political
and economic integration. German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl promised “blooming landscapes” to
evolve in east Germany within a short period of
time.1 What actually has happened in the 15 years
that have passed since German unification? How did
the east German economy develop? We will discuss
the east German convergence process,the main eco-
nomic barriers to a speedier development and the
future challenges for the east German economy.
Initial expectations and factual speed of GDP per
capita convergence
Given the political and economic institutions in
Germany, most economists predicted steady income
convergence of the “new” east German states.
Compared to other transition countries, it was
believed that the “new” states could immediately
benefit from a well established legal framework and
from massive fiscal transfers from the “old” states.
However, opinions differed greatly with respect to
the speed of convergence.2
A number of economists expected the east German
economy to catch up quite quickly to the west Ger-
man level.One of the most optimistic forecasts came
from Willgerodt who, in a study for the German
Federal Government, argued that eastern Germany
might reach western Germany’s GDP per capita in
only three to five years (see Thimann, 1995 p. 34).
Similarly optimistic, Siebert (1990) believed that the
process of convergence could be completed within a
period of five to ten years.The Institute for Applied
Economic Research (1991) was only slightly less
optimistic, expecting that eastern Germany could
reach 80 percent of the west German level by 2000.
A study by McDonald and Thumann (1991) came to
the same conclusion.
Not all economists were that optimistic, however.
Sinn and Sinn (1991) as well as Helmstädter
(1991) argued that it would take a period of at
least 20 years up to a generation until east
Germany would be on a par with west Germany.
Huges Hallet and Ma (1993) predicted 30 to
40 years for this process. Westermann (1995)
expected east Germany not to reach 80 percent of
the west German level before 2025.The most pes-
simistic forecast came from Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1991) who projected a convergence peri-
od of more than 70 years.
Figure 1 shows alternative convergence scenarios. In
1991, east German GDP per capita amounted to
42.5 percent of the west German level. Starting in
1991, we plottet various possible convergence sce-
narios on the assumption that west Germany’s GDP
per capita would have risen at a rate of 1.8 percent
per annum.3 An annual growth rate of 3 percent in
east Germany’s GDP per capita implies that east
Germany would achieve west Germany’s level in
2020.We also illustrate the earlier predictions of var-
ious economists on the convergence process.In 2004,
east Germany reached 66.8 percent of west
Germany’s level.
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1 Of course, one should take into account that this promise was
made during the election campaign of the December 2000 Federal
Election, the first all-German election since 1932.Thus Chancellor
Kohl may have been well aware of his overly optimistic promise.
2 For an overview on the various forecasts on East-West-conver-
gence see Thimann (1996), p. 34–43.
3 This assumption is identical to the one made by Thimann (1995).
However, different from Thimann our illustration starts out from







Looking at the process of con-
vergence in recent years, one
might get the impression that
even the most pessimistic fore-
casts might turn out to be wish-
ful thinking. Figure 2 shows
GDP per capita in east and west
Germany for the period 1991 to
2004. The lower panel depicts
the gap in GDP per capita
between east and west Germa-
ny.The early years after unifica-
tion supported the belief of
income convergence. The gap
between east and west Germa-
ny narrowed markedly in these
years. Until 1995, the difference
in GDP per capita shrank by
€1,000 per year or 10 percent of
the initial gap; east Germany’s
GDP per capita reached two
thirds of the western level in
1995. Since then, however, the
convergence process of eastern
Germany has come to a halt.
From 1996 to 2004, GDP per
capita grew at almost exactly
the same rate as in the west.As
the initial GDP level was lower,
the absolute gap has grown
again.
The actual gap would be even
larger if account were taken of
the fact that east Germany has
lost a significant part of its orig-
inal population. From 1991 to
2004 its population declined
from 14.5 million to 13.4 million
people (without Berlin). The
blue line in Figure 3 presents
the actual population figures
from 1991 to 2004;the black line
illustrates the initial population
in 1990. The orange line shows
how the population would have
grown without migration. The
remaining population decline
(the vertical distance between
the black and orange lines) rep-
resents the natural population
growth. Births declined sharply
after unification and still remain














1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027
7 %
1 Willgerodt (1990) ,  2 Siebert (1990),  3 IAW (1991) and McDonald and Thumann (1999),  4 Sinn and Sinn (1991), 
5 Helmstädter (1991),   6 Hughes Hallet and Ma (1993),   7 Westermann (1995),   8 Barro (1991)
Actual level of convergence (66.8 %)
 EXPECTATIONS ON CONVERGENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST  
GERMANY AND ALTERNATIVE CONVERGENCE SCENARIOS
Source: Own calculations based on data provided by Arbeitskreis VGR der Länder; the illustration is based on Thiman 
(1995), Table 2, p. 38. Assumption: annunal growth of West Germany's GDP per Capita of 1.8 per cent.
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Sources: Own calculations based on data provided by Arbeitskreis VGR der Länder.
 GDP PER CAPITA IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY
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Figure 2generating a deficit of births
over deaths. If population had
been kept at its original level
(1990), GDP per capita in east
Germany (without Berlin)
would be lower by roughly
1,600 €  which makes up for
almost 10 percent of GDP per
capita. Hence, the fairly stable
ratio of GDP levels since 1995
can partly be attributed to the
statistical artifact of declining
population in the east.4
Structural convergence
The interesting question is why
the initial process of convergence came to a halt in
1996.An important part of the answer is that a large
proportion of the initial growth originated in the
construction sector. In Figure 4 we show the growth
rates of gross value added of east Germany’s con-
struction and manufacturing sectors during the peri-
od 1992 to 2004. Obviously, the construction sector
experienced enormous growth during the early
years after reunification thereby contributing signif-
icantly to the period of GDP convergence from 1991
to 1996. A large part of this growth was caused by
public investment in the infrastructure. Moreover,
generous subsidies and tax exemptions induced pri-
vate investors to put large amounts of money into
the renovation of buildings. During the first half of
the 1990s, the share of east Germany’s construction
sector in total gross value added increased to more
than 14 percent (see Figure 5) peaking at around 18
percent in most east German states (without
Berlin).At the same time, the share of the construc-
tion sector in total west German gross value added
was below 6 percent. When public and private
investment in infrastructure and buildings ceased in
the mid-1990s, the construction sector started to
shrink.Since 1996,east Germany’s construction sec-
tor has contracted in every single year. Figure 5
reveals that the construction sector in all east
German states (without Berlin) is still larger than
the west German average, indicating that the
process of consolidation has not ended.
The development of the manufacturing sector was
initially much slower than of the construction sector
but also proved to be more sustainable. Since 1993,
east Germany’s manufacturing
sector has grown every single
year, in 2004 at a rate of 7.4 per-
cent (gross value added).
Although this growth started
from a comparatively low level,
the figures indicate that at least
the process of structural conver-
gence is on a good way. As
depicted in Figure 6,the share of
the manufacturing sector in total
gross value added in most east
German states is converging
toward the German average.
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4 Of course, one has to take into account
that also GDP would have been higher
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Labour markets
The poor growth performance of
east Germany since 1996 is mir-
rored in the labour market.
Figure 7 depicts employment
(employees subject to social
insurance) in east and west
Germany. We take 1995 as the
starting point to exclude the
early, economically turbulent
years after unification. West
Germany shows the typical cycli-
cal employment pattern. There
was a moderate decline in the
early 1990s, but when growth
rates rose during the “New
Economy” hype, employment
returned to its initial level and
then declined again.The pattern
is completely different in east
Germany. There employment
shows a strong downward trend
over the entire period. east
German employment fell by
more than 20 percent in ten
years. The “new” states suffered
a daily loss of 380 jobs.
The decline in employment is
accompanied by an increase in
unemployment (and,at the same
time, by a significant amount of
migration to west Germany).
The rising unemployment, how-
ever, is far from equally distrib-
uted among the population. The
risk of unemployment is highly
correlated with skill levels. Low-
skilled workers face a signifi-
cantly higher risk of being unem-
ployed. Figure 8 shows the skill-
specific unemployment rates for
east and west Germany. For
high-skilled workers, i.e. those
with a university degree, unem-
ployment is roughly at the natur-
al level, and the difference
between east and west Germany
is fairly small. Of course, the low
unemployment rate among high-
skilled workers in east Germany
is partly explained by the high
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Figure 8and not necessarily by high local
labour demand. Medium-skilled
workers already face a signifi-
cantly higher risk of unemploy-
ment. Their unemployment rate
amounts to 7.3 percent in west
Germany and more than twice
that much (19.4 percent) in east
Germany. Figure 8 also shows
who bore the largest burden of
the job losses in the past.It is the
group of low-skilled workers.
Even in west Germany, 20 per-
cent of the low-skilled work
force is without employment. In
east Germany, however, every
other low-skilled worker is un-
employed. The Figure also illustrates the rapid in-
crease in the unemployment rate from around
30 percent in the beginning of the 1990s up to 50 per-
cent since the mid-1990s.
Bringing the medium-skilled and low-skilled work-
ers back into employment is one of the major poli-
cy tasks in the near future;it could help to close the
productivity gap between east and west Germany a
bit further. As pointed out earlier, the disappoint-
ing performance of east Germany in terms of pro-
ductivity and employment is largely home-made.
Unemployment benefits and social assistance
define an implicit minimum wage because almost
no one would be willing to work for less than the
transfer received from the welfare state. For high-
skilled workers, such an implicit minimum wage is
not binding and market clearing wages lead to
(almost) full employment. The lower the skills, the
more likely it is that the minimum wage becomes
binding.Hence,the implicit minimum wage created
by the welfare state explains the skill-specific pat-
tern of unemployment in Germany.As the rules of
the west German welfare state were extended to
east Germany,the implicit minimum wage is almost
the same as in the west.Given the lower productiv-
ity, the implicit minimum wage is responsible for
the higher unemployment among low- and medi-
um-skilled workers in east Germany. Appropriate
reforms have to tackle this problem by lowering
the implicit minimum wage or by reducing non-
wage costs.5
Conclusion and future challenges
Without question, the evolution of the east German
economy has not met politicians’ and economists’
initial expectations.The same seems to hold true for
the German population in terms of general life satis-
faction,as measured by the Eurobarometer survey.It
declined for both east and west Germans over the
period 1990 to 2003 (see Figure 9). East Germans
reported lower life satisfaction over the entire peri-
od. Since individual unemployment and one’s rela-
tive income position are major reasons for dissatis-
faction, this result is not too surprising.6 While life
satisfaction in east and west converged during the
1990s, recent developments go in the opposite direc-
tion – a result which is in line with the interrupted
process of economic convergence.7
One may expect the convergence in life satisfaction
to start again when economic conditions improve.
The well developing manufacturing sector in several
east German states gives rise to the hope that the
process of economic convergence will continue once
the structural adjustment in the construction sector
has come to a halt.
Even though there is some reason to believe that
east Germany can return to a path of catch-up
growth during the next decades, there are at least
two major challenges for the future development of
the east German economy: the consequences of the
demographic change and the unhealthy state of east
German public finances.
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Sources: Eurobarometer; own calculations.
Figure 9
5 For a detailed reform proposal, see Sinn et al. (2003). As the
reduction of the implicit minimum wage can only be achieved by
reducing social transfers, the losers in this reform have to be com-
pensated by granting them tax credit on earned income.
6 See Frey and Stutzer (2002).
7 See Berlemann and Kemmesies (2004), Frijters, DeNew and
Shields (2004) and Stutzer and Frey (2004) for more detailed stud-
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While the total population in Germany will remain
almost constant for the next 20 years,8 east
Germany will face a steep decline in its population
(see Figure 10). In 2030, the east German popula-
tion will have dropped to 85 percent of its 2000
level. Low fertility rates and an aging population
contribute to this decline.The decline of the work-
ing age population is even more dramatic.Since the
average age of the population is rising, the active
population aged 15 to 65 will shrink by 30 percent
from 2000 to 2030.
Why should we care? A smaller population is not
necessarily a bad thing – particularly in a densely
populated country like Germany. Moreover, the
out-migration of workers may be an efficient reac-
tion to better employment conditions in other
German regions. For east Germany, however, it is a
threatening development as it weakens its compara-
tive advantage in knowledge-intensive production
in a global economy. Given the rigidities in the
German labour market, demographic change will
not eliminate unemployment among the low-skilled
but may create scarcity of the high-skilled – thus
making east Germany less attractive in firms’ loca-
tion choices.9
A second challenge is the imbalance of public
finances in east Germany. 15 years after unification
the revenue sources of east German regional
administrative bodies are still
insufficient to finance their cur-
rent expenditures.To date,a sig-
nificant part of these expendi-
tures are financed by transfers
from west Germany. These
funds, however, will decrease in
future years. For instance, the
transfers resulting from the
“Solidary Pact II” (€10 billion
in 2005) will be phased out until
2020. At the same time, expen-
ditures are unlikely to be cut at
this rate. Employment in the
public sector will only gradually
shrink to reduce the burden of
the public payroll. Some expen-
diture categories will even increase, for instance
those for public pensions of state employees.
According to estimates of the Ifo Institute (Fester
and Thum 2003), expenditures on pensions in
Saxony will increase from roughly €50 million in
2005 to €400 million in 2020.
While east German politics has recognized the need
for fiscal consolidation in general,it is yet unclear by
which measures the expected shortfall in revenues
will be met. Even if the process of convergence
between east and west Germany picks up speed
again, it will be overly optimistic to expect that the
resulting tax revenues alone would be sufficient to
generate balanced budgets in east Germany within
the next decades.
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